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PREFACE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs (G-24). The G-24 was established in
1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the negotiating strength of the
developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the international financial
institutions.  The G-24 is the only formal developing-country grouping within the IMF
and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing countries.
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD’s Macroeconomic and
Development Policies Branch, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce a
development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional
reform.
The research carried out under the project is coordinated by Professor Dani Rodrik,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. The research papers are
discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings of  the G-24 Technical Group,
and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers and Deputies in their preparations
for negotiations and discussions in the framework of the IMF’s International Monetary
and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee) and the Joint IMF/IBRD
Development Committee, as well as in other forums. Previously, the research papers for
the G-24 were published by UNCTAD in the collection International Monetary and
Financial Issues for the 1990s.  Between 1992 and 1999 more than 80 papers were
published in 11 volumes of this collection, covering a wide range of monetary and financial
issues of major interest to developing countries. Since the beginning of 2000 the studies
are published jointly by UNCTAD and the Center for International Development at
Harvard University in the G-24 Discussion Paper Series.
The Project of Technical Support to the G-24 receives generous financial support
from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and the Governments of
Denmark and the Netherlands, as well as contributions from the countries participating
in the meetings of the  G-24.THE IMPACT OF G-3 EXCHANGE RATE
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Abstract
This paper describes G-3 exchange rate volatility and evaluates its
impact on developing countries. The paper presents empirical evidence
showing that G-3 exchange rate volatility has a robust and significantly
negative impact on developing countries’ exports. A one percentage point
increase in G-3 exchange rate volatility decreases real exports of developing
countries by about 2 per cent, on average. G-3 exchange rate volatility
also appears to have a negative influence on foreign direct investment to
certain regions, and increases the probability of occurrence of exchange
rate crises in developing countries. These results imply that greater stability
in the international exchange rate system would help improve trade and
foreign direct investment prospects for developing countries – and would
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I. Introduction
There is a widespread presumption that volatil-
ity on the exchange rates of developed countries is
one of the main sources of economic instability
around the world. For example, an influential group
of people which includes, among others, Paul Volcker
and George Soros, has recently stated that “… the
impact of the global economy on emerging countries
is driven significantly by swings among the curren-
cies of the three major economic powers. In recent
years these swings have been enormous, volatile and
frequently unrelated to underlying economic funda-
mentals. … The current G-3 authorities intervene on
a totally ad hoc and episodic basis, without any clear
sense of a sustainable equilibrium. Such interven-
tion typically comes too late to prevent severe
currency misalignments. These imbalances, in turn,
trigger major economic distortions, protectionist
trade pressures, and inevitably sharp currency revers-
als that generate a second round of large costs.”
(Allaire et al., 1999).
These criticisms are not new. In fact, the ex-
change rate arrangement that emerged after the
collapse of Bretton-Woods has always been criticized
on the grounds that it does not have a mechanism to
reduce or regulate excessive exchange rate fluctua-
tions among the major currencies.1 More recently, it
has also been argued that G-3 currency instability2
may have been at the root of some of the currency and
financial crises that have affected several developing
countries. A prominent example in this regard is the
Asian crisis of 1997 which, for many authors, was partly
due to the strong appreciation of the dollar vis-à-vis
the yen that took place between mid-1995 and 1998.3
As a consequence, there is renewed interest on
the debate about whether more stable relationships
amongst the G-3 currencies can bring about greater
stability to the world economy, in general, and to the
* A previous version of this paper was presented at the G-24 Technical Group Meeting in Washington, DC, 17–18 April 2001.
The authors would like to thank the very useful comments of Dani Rodrik and other participants at that meeting, and the excellent
research assistance of Francisco Arias, Alejandra Huerta and Pedro Martínez.
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developing economies, in particular.4 Of course, the
debate on this issue crucially depends on the nature
and magnitude of the impact of G-3 exchange rate
volatility on the world economy. Unfortunately, there
are no currently available estimates on any of the
effects that G-3 exchange rate volatility may have
on other economies. This paper will attempt to shed
light on this issue by providing the first empirical
estimates on the impact of G-3 currency volatility
on developing countries.
There is, indeed, a substantial amount of re-
search about the effects of volatility of a country’s
own real exchange on certain macroeconomic vari-
ables. Caballero and Corbo (1989), for example,
show that higher volatility of the real exchange rate
hurt exports in a large group of developing coun-
tries. Many other authors have also attempted to
investigate whether exchange rate variability de-
presses trade flows in different periods and for
different countries. This literature has been surveyed
by McKenzie (1999), who concludes that empirical
results on this matter have so far been inconclusive.
Recent and stronger evidence of a negative impact
of exchange rate volatility on trade flows can be
found in Arize et al. (2000) and Dell’Ariccia (1999).
On the other hand, Larraín and Vergara (1993)
show that real exchange rate volatility (measured by
its coefficient of variation) hurt the rate of private
investment in emerging Asia. Similarly, Dupont and
Juan-Ramón (1996) explore the relationship between
real exchange-rate variability and commodity prices.
They found that the dollar price of a small number
of commodities is affected by the parities between
the deutsche mark and the dollar and between the
yen and the dollar.
In spite of the abundant literature on the effects
of exchange rate volatility on macroeconomic vari-
ables, there is not a single paper that had attempted
to identify the role of third-country exchange rate
volatility on domestic macroeconomic variables.
This paper attempts to fill this gap by exploring the
effects of G-3 currency volatility on developing coun-
tries. It begins by discussing the alternative channels
through which volatility in the major currencies may
exert a negative influence on developing economies.
It then describes the stylized facts about G-3 cur-
rency volatility since 1973. The next sections present
preliminary evidence on the impact of G-3 currency
volatility on trade flows, foreign direct investment
and on the probability of occurrence of exchange rate
crises in developing countries since 1975. The final
section presents the authors’ conclusions.
II. Likely impacts of G-3 currency
volatility in developing countries
There are several channels through which G-3
currency instability may affect developing countries.
Some of the variables often mentioned as being in-
fluenced by this volatility are: trade flows; foreign
direct investment; currency crises; debt servicing
costs; portfolio composition; and commodity prices.
Of course, the specific channels and reasons
behind each one of these effects may differ across
variables. However, the standard argument on the
likely impact of G-3 currency instability on devel-
oping countries goes as follows: given that most of
the international economic transactions take place
in dollars, yens or euros, exchange rate instability
and/or exchange rate uncertainty among these three
currencies, if combined with risk-averse agents, may
lead to increased instability in international economic
transactions. This, in turn, may provoke distortions,
uncertainty and economic fluctuations worldwide
which may negatively affect the developing world.
Each of the main channels that have been iden-
tified in this discussion is reviewed in greater detail
below.
A. Trade flows
The relationship between exchange rate vola-
tility and trade is well established. The basic idea is
the following: if commodity traders are risk averse
(or even risk neutral), higher exchange rate uncer-
tainty may lead to a reduction in the volume of trade
because they may not want to risk their expected prof-
its from trade (Brodsky, 1984). As long as there is
uncertainty, economic agents will demand a higher
price to cover their exposure to currency risk, and
this, in turn, will decrease the volume of trade. Now,
since most of the international transactions take place
in some of the G-3 currencies, increased exchange
rate uncertainty among them may have an effect
which is equivalent to a higher uncertainty on the
bilateral exchange rate. Therefore, higher G-3 currency
volatility may also lead to a lower volume of trade.
However, this is just the direct effect, and there
may be other (perhaps more important) indirect ef-
fects of G-3 exchange rate volatility on trade. Sup-
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one of the main world currencies. If there is instabil-
ity among the G-3 exchange rates, rapid movements
in the real exchange rate among these countries may
have an indirect effect on the competitiveness of all
the countries that are pegged (explicitly or implic-
itly) to one of the main currencies. Of course, the
effect on trade of movements on G-3 parities depends
on whether the anchor currency is appreciating or
depreciating vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
B. Foreign direct investment
G-3 currency volatility may also affect devel-
oping countries through its effects on foreign direct
investment inflows.5 Two channels have been iden-
tified here. To start with, greater exchange rate
volatility increases uncertainty over the return of a
given investment. Potential investors will invest in a
foreign location only as long as the expected returns
are high enough to cover for the currency risk. Thus,
foreign direct investment will be lower under higher
exchange rate volatility.
The second channel works as follows: changes
in the bilateral real exchange rates of the major cur-
rencies will have an immediate impact on the real
wealth of the G-3 countries. Since G-3 countries are
among the main sources of FDI, changes in their bi-
lateral real exchange rate affect their real wealth, and
this may have a direct impact on the amount and di-
rection of foreign direct investment. This effect,
however, is ambiguous. It may increase or decrease
foreign direct investment depending on which cur-
rencies are appreciating or depreciating. The final
effect will also depend on the relevance of FDI on
the source countries and on the wealth elasticity of
FDI on the different source countries.
C. Currency crises
It has been argued recently that G-3 exchange
rate instability may have contributed to the Asian
crisis of 1997, mainly based on the observation that
during the months that preceded the crises, the dol-
lar had a large and relatively rapid appreciation
vis-à-vis the deutsche mark and the yen (see charts 1
and 2). As a result, all the currencies that were then
pegged to the dollar also appreciated with respect to
the deutsche mark and the yen. This deteriorated the
relative price competitiveness of these countries, thus
contributing to a deterioration of their external ac-
counts, and may have eventually led to the Asian
currency crises.
However, the effects on developing countries
are not unambiguous. Countries with exchange rates
that were pegged to other currencies (i.e. the deutsche
mark and the yen) experienced the opposite effects.
In this sense, it is important to emphasize that some
arguments against exchange rate volatility usually
criticize not the volatility itself, but a continuous
change of one currency in certain direction.
D. Debt servicing costs
One of the most important effects of G-3 ex-
change rate movements on developing countries
refers to the external debt burden. Most developing
economies are net debtors and, in consequence,
changes in the G-3 exchange rates may affect the
real cost of servicing their debts. A strong apprecia-
tion of the dollar, for example, implies a higher cost
of servicing an external debt that is mainly thus de-
nominated. Although this argument is correct, the
impact of changes in the G-3 exchange rates on de-
veloping countries are not in a single direction. In
the example used above, countries with higher share
of debt denominated in the yen or the deutsche mark
will have lower costs of debt servicing and their bal-
ance sheets will improve as a result of a strong
appreciation of the dollar.6
Summarizing, G-3 exchange rate changes may
affect developing countries in different ways depend-
ing on their debt denomination and on which of the
major currencies they are more closely connected
to. Most of these channels, however, are more re-
lated to the levels in the G-3 parities than to the
volatility or uncertainty associated to them. Excep-
tions are the trade and foreign direct investment
channels which suggest that G-3 real exchange rate
volatility may indeed reduce both types of flows to
developing countries.
In the following the stylized facts on G-3 ex-
change-rate volatility will be described, before it will
be tested empirically whether these channels have
indeed affected developing countries in the recent
past, and whether G-3 exchange-rate volatility has
had any influence on increasing the probability of
currency crises in developing countries.4 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 16
III. G-3 currency volatility
A. G-3 exchange rates: stylized facts
The 1973 collapse of the Bretton-Woods ar-
rangement gave way to a period of floating exchange
rates throughout the developed world. Chart 1 shows
the historical nominal G-3 exchange rates since that
year. The chart illustrates some of the most impor-
tant swings that have occurred in the past decades
amongst the G-3 exchange rates. It makes clear that
both the deutsche mark and the yen have tended to
appreciate vis-à-vis the dollar since 1973, and that the
yen has appreciated with respect to the deutsche mark.
Some periods, though, show a moderate up-
ward-sloping trend, that was soon reversed. To the
naked eye, the longest rally in reverse was the ap-
preciation of the dollar with respect to the deutsche
mark between 1979 and 1985. This was followed,
however, by a period of rapid decline in the dollar.
Chart 2 shows the historical bilateral real ex-
change rates (deflated by consumer prices) for each
one of the G-3 currencies. Following Clarida (1999),
the chart also shows a hypothetical PPP bilateral
exchange rate, which assumes that real exchange
rates were in equilibrium at the time of the Louvre
Accord (February, 1987). A simple comparison be-
tween charts 1 and 2 confirms that most of the
changes in the nominal exchange rates amongst the
G-3 currencies have had, at least temporarily, real
effects. This chart also shows that PPP estimates of
the G-3 currencies suggest a continuous apprecia-
tion of the deutsche mark and the yen vis-à-vis the
dollar. Similarly, the PPP estimates suggest a rela-
tively stable relationship between the yen and the
deutsche mark. The most striking result is that real
bilateral exchange rates have departed substantially
from the hypothetical PPP exchange rate, particular-
ly during the seventies, mid-eighties and late nineties.
B. Measure of volatility
One of the most common measures of exchange
rate volatility is the standard deviation of the growth
rates of real exchange rates (V).7 This measure is
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where R is the natural log of the bilateral real ex-
change rate (e) and m is the order of the moving
average.8
An alternative measure of exchange rate vola-
tility is defined as the time-varying twelve-month
coefficient of variation (CV) of the real exchange rate




 is the mean of the bilateral real exchange
rate between months t and t+m-1.
Charts 3 and 4 show both measures of volatil-
ity for the bilateral G-3 exchange rates. A simple
comparison between the two measures of exchange
rate volatility highlights the main differences between
them. For example, while the CV measure indicates
a large increase in the dispersion of the G-3 real ex-
change rates in 1981 and 1986 for the deutsche mark
vis-à-vis the dollar; in 1976, 1986 and 1996 for the
yen vis-à-vis the dollar, and in the late 1970s for the
yen vis-à-vis the deutsche mark, the volatility meas-
ure (V) only suggests moderate increases in volatility
in the late seventies for the three real exchange rates
and in the late nineties for the rate of the yen vis-à-
vis the dollar.
A simple inspection of charts 2–4, suggests that
the standard measure of volatility (V) misrepresents
what is taking place on the bilateral G-3 real exchange
rates. It fails to identify periods of rapid but sustained
change in the real exchange rate (as occurred, for
example, with the deutsche mark against the dollar
in 1986). On the other hand, the coefficient of varia-
tion measure is successful in capturing these events
and, therefore, will be the measure of exchange rate
volatility in what follows.9
C. Interest rate volatility versus
exchange rate volatility
It has been pointed out that reducing G-3 ex-
change rate volatility may come at the cost of higher
interest rate variability, which in turn may translate
into higher variability on debt servicing costs for
developing countries (Reinhart and Reinhart, 2000a).
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terest rate and exchange rate variability has occurred,
annual versions of the CV for these two variables
for the G-3 countries between 1973 and 1998 were
computed.10 This approach is undoubtedly simplis-
tic and crude, but might provide an initial approxi-
mation to the issue. The results of this exercise are
shown in chart 5. Each chart also shows an adjusted
linear regression, its corresponding equation and the
R2 of the estimated equation.
The charts show that there is no apparent trade-
off between interest rate and exchange rate variabil-
ity for the G-3 countries. Instead, in Japan and the
United States there exists evidence of a positive sim-
ple correlation between these two types of variabil-
ity. Of course, the existence of a trade-off between
these two indicators may be hidden as result of move-
ments in other variables that influences any of them.
However, it is not clear, based on this preliminary
evidence, that lower exchange rate variability will
bring about higher interest rate variability.
D. G-3 exchange rate changes and
multilateral real exchange rates
In this section an attempt is made to identify
the contribution of changes in G-3 exchange rates
on the effective real exchange rates of developing
countries, following Reinhart and Reinhart (2000b)
in decomposing changes in the effective real ex-
change rate of a country into changes in the bilateral
dollar exchange rate and all other dollar cross ex-
change rates.
Consider the following expression of an effec-
tive real exchange rate:
where ei
t is the effective real exchange rate, si
t
j are the
bilateral real exchange rates between country i and
country j, and the  si’s are weights.
Given that the  si’s must add up to one, we can
restate the previous equation as:
where st
iUS is the bilateral real exchange rate of coun-
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Table 1
IMPACT OF G-3 EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES ON REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES,
JANUARY 1980 – DECEMBER 1998
Bilateral real
Country exchange rate Deutsche mark / dollar Yen / dollar Adjusted R-squared
Latin America and the Caribbean
Argentina 0.489 -0.094 -0.076 0.635
(19.87)* (-0.866) (-0.750)
Bolivia 0.962 -0.693 0.046 0.786
(28.85)* (-2.340)** (0.176)***
Brazil 0.924 -0.154 -0.135 0.796
(28.57)* (-3.874)* (-3.598)*
Colombia 0.598 -0.328 -0.135 0.680
(14.05)* (-9.480)* (-4.345)*
Costa Rica 1.000 -0.229 -0.073 0.977
(95.66)* (-10.730)* (-3.840)*
Chile 0.998 -0.383 -0.119 0.886
(38.76)* (-12.629)* (-4.336)*
Dominica 0.552 -0.289 -0.082 0.613
(10.29)* (-10.253)* (-3.243)*
Ecuador 0.517 -0.189 -0.206 0.318
(9.197)* (-1.631)*** (-1.991)**
Mexico 0.953 -0.118 -0.041 0.909
(47.19)* (-3.055)* (-1.138)
Paraguay 0.491 -0.310 0.075 0.514
(15.09)* (-3.217)* (0.872)
Peru 0.699 -0.188 -0.089 0.626
(19.37)* (-1.491) (-0.744)
Uruguay 0.774 -0.413 -0.112 0.800
(27.56)* (-6.417)* (-1.937)***
Venezuela 0.572 -0.245 -0.150 0.732
(24.20)* (-2.908)* (-1.981)**
Sub-Saharan Africa
Côte d’Ivoire 0.992 -0.531 -0.092 0.963
(74.56)* (-18.063)* (-3.887)*
Gambia 0.939 -0.502 -0.103 0.943
(61.51)* (-16.711)* (-3.965)*
Nigeria 0.861 -0.574 -0.227 0.656
(20.12)* (-3.340)* (-1.472)
South Africa 0.975 -0.528 -0.144 0.979
(102.3)* (-36.239)* (-11.34)*
East Asia and the Pacific
Fiji 0.836 -0.226 -0.179 0.832
(33.36)* (-8.668)* (-7.501)*
Indonesia 0.947 -0.138 -0.187 0.954
(68.89)* (-4.069)* (-5.833)*
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Table 1 (concluded)
IMPACT OF G-3 EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES ON REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES,
JANUARY 1980 – DECEMBER 1998
Bilateral real
Country exchange rate Deutsche mark / dollar Yen / dollar Adjusted R-squared
Philippines 0.774 -0.140 -0.120 0.665
(19.51)* (-3.296)* (-2.995)*
Samoa 0.718 -0.264 -0.099 0.738
(24.56)* (-7.612)* (-3.152)*
Republic of Korea 0.861 -0.124 -0.168 0.827
(32.00)* (-4.188)* (-5.987)*
Malaysia 0.842 -0.248 -0.214 0.935
(54.11)* (-16.044)* (-15.11)*
Thailand 0.725 -0.107 -0.174 0.702
(22.43)* (-3.187)* (-5.529)*
South Asia
India 0.779 -0.285 -0.063 0.595
(16.08)* (-7.248)* (-1.708)***
Pakistan 0.808 -0.420 -0.146 0.809
(20.69)* (-16.688)* (-6.531)*
Middle East and North Africa
Morocco 0.741 -0.543 -0.045 0.704
(22.21)* (-18.670)* (-2.470)**
Europe and Central Asia
Turkey 0.619 -0.175 -0.008 0.609
(18.68)* (-3.630)* (-0.189)
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 1,  5 and 10 per cent level, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
This expression can be log-differentiated to get:
D1n  (ei
t) = a1 + a2 D 1n  (st
iUS) + a2 D 1n
(DM / $) + a3 D 1n  (Yen / $) + ...
From this expression, the relative contribution of the
changes in the G-3 exchange rates to the variability
of the multilateral real exchange rate of any country
can be separated out. This equation was then esti-
mated for 28 developing countries using monthly log
changes in the bilateral real exchange rates for the
period 1980–1998.
Table 1 presents the results of these regressions.
It shows the prominent role played by the bilateral
dollar exchange rate in the determination of changes
in the multilateral real exchange rate of all developing
countries included in the table. In all the regressions,
the coefficients associated to this variable are statis-
tically significant at the 1 per cent level and they
usually take values well above 0.5. This means that
an important share of the variations in the bilateral
real exchange rate translates into changes in the ef-
fective real exchange rate of developing countries.
On the other hand, many of the coefficients on the
G-3/dollar exchange rates are also significant but tend10 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 16
to be much smaller in magnitude. As expected, most
of the coefficients associated to these variables are
negative, which means that, for example, when the yen
appreciates with respect to the dollar, the domestic
currency depreciates with respect to the world.
In order to analyse in more detail the contribu-
tion of G-3 exchange rate changes to the effective
real exchange rate of developing countries, the fol-
lowing exercise was performed. First, a regression
excluding the bilateral real exchange rate against the
dollar was estimated. Then the R2 of this regression
was compared against the marginal increase in the
R2 that is obtained when the bilateral exchange rate
was added. The objective of this exercise is to compare
the explanatory power of the changes in the parities
of the dollar vis-à-vis the yen and the deutsche mark
against that of the changes in the dollar bilateral ex-
change rate. The results of this exercise are presented
in chart 6. The chart shows quite convincingly that
the single most important determinant of changes in
the effective real exchange rate of most developing
countries is the bilateral dollar real exchange rate.
In conclusion, results in table 1 and chart 6 show
that changes in the exchange rates among the three
major currencies tend to exert a relatively small in-
fluence on the effective real exchange rate of many
developing countries.
IV. Impact of G-3 currency volatility
on trade
In this section a first approximation on whether
G-3 exchange-rate instability has a negative impact
on trade flows of developing countries is provided.
The basic question of whether a country’s own ex-
change rate volatility has an effect on external trade
has a long tradition in economics and there is a vast
number of papers addressing the issue.11 However,
as far as is known by the authors, there are no previ-
ous empirical attempts to estimate the volatility of
third-country exchange rates on the trade flows of
developing countries.
As mentioned above, log changes in the multi-
lateral real exchange rate of a given country can be
partially explained by changes in both the bilateral
real exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar, and in the bi-
lateral G-3 real exchange rates against the dollar.
Therefore, it has to be estimated whether G-3 cur-
rency volatility has had a negative effect on the
exports of developing countries.
In particular, the interest is in estimating an
exports function of the form:
X  =  f (world demand, bilateral dollar real
exchange rate, G-3 currency volatility)
which, in linear form, can be expressed as:
1n (Xt) = a + b . 1n (GDPw) + c . RERUS
+ d . VOLYen / $ + e . VOLDM / $ + et
where X are real exports, GDPw is the real world GDP,
RERUS is the bilateral real exchange rate with respect
to the dollar and the variables VOL are measures of
exchange rate volatility.12
Chart 6
CONTRIBUTION OF CHANGES IN G-3
EXCHANGE RATES TO MULTILATERAL
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Tables 2 and 3 show the results obtained after
estimating this regression for a group of forty devel-
oping countries. Each table uses a different measure
of volatility and each regression is estimated using
annual data for the 1973–1998 period. Only the co-
efficients associated to the volatility measures as well
as the adjusted coefficients of determination for each
regression are reported.
The tables show that several of the coefficients
associated to G-3 volatility variables are negative and
statistically significant. In particular, when the stand-
ard volatility measure (that is, the standard deviation
of the log changes of the RER, or V), is used, it is
found that in nine regressions at least one volatility
coefficient is negatively significant. However, when
the coefficient of variation is used as the measure of
volatility (table 3), G-3 currency volatility reduces
developing countries’ exports in most cases (23 out of
40 countries). In a few cases an unexpected signifi-
cant positive effect of volatility on exports was found.
In general, the empirical analysis indicates that
higher volatility among the G-3 parities leads to lower
exports of developing countries. This result is not
only statistically significant but also economically
important. On average, the estimated coefficients
suggest that a one percentage point increase in the
coefficient of variation of the deutsche mark/dollar
real exchange rate reduces exports of developing
countries in about 2 per cent. For the Asian coun-
tries, this effect is even higher (about 3 per cent on
average). It is important to note that there have been
years in which the coefficient of variation has risen
by more than 4 percentage points, thus suggesting a
very important negative effect on developing coun-
tries’ exports in those periods.
V. Impact of G-3 currency volatility
on foreign direct investment
As mentioned above, if potential foreign inves-
tors are risk averse (or even risk neutral), larger
exchange rate volatility may reduce overall foreign
direct investment inflows. This section tests whether
G-3 exchange rate volatility has had a negative ef-
fect on foreign direct investment flows to developing
countries.
Tables 4 and 5 show the results of this exercise
with annual data for the period 1975–1998. Each table
uses a different measure of exchange rate volatility.
Also, each one has two panels: the upper part uses as
dependent variable, the level of foreign direct invest-
ment as a percentage of gross domestic investment,
whereas the lower part uses as a dependent variable,
the level of FDI as a percentage of gross domestic
product. In addition, each panel shows two types of
estimates. The first estimates are obtained after con-
trolling for the level of the world interest rate, which
in this case is proxied by the United States interest
rate, and they also include a trend variable. The sec-
ond set of estimates only includes a trend variable
and the G-3 volatility variables as independent vari-
ables.
Instead of running separate regression for each
developing country, this section focuses on FDI flows
to geographical regions. Accordingly, FDI variables
represent regional averages. Table 4 shows the coef-
ficients on the G-3 exchange rate volatilities when
the standard measure of volatility (V) is used. Only a
handful of coefficients are statistically significant and
some of them have the wrong sign. The regression
for the Middle East and North Africa is the only one
that has a negatively significant coefficient. In gen-
eral, results in this table suggest that G-3 exchange
rate volatility has no discernible effect on foreign
direct investment flows to developing countries.
Table 5 shows the results obtained when the
coefficient of variation is used as a measure of ex-
change rate volatility. In this case, there is stronger
empirical evidence suggesting that G-3 exchange rate
volatility may have a negative effect on FDI flows to
certain regions. The number of regions that are af-
fected depends on the exact specification chosen
(with or without controlling for changes in the United
States interest rate) and on the dependent variable
being analysed. For example, if FDI is seen as a per-
centage of gross domestic investment (upper panel),
it may be concluded that G-3 currency volatility re-
duces FDI flows to either two or four regions
depending on whether changes in the world interest
rate are controlled for or not. In general, it seems
that FDI flows to sub-Saharan Africa and to the East
Asia and the Pacific are the ones more clearly af-
fected by changes in the G-3 currency volatility. In
contrast, FDI flows to the Middle East and Latin
America do not seem to be influenced by changes in
G-3 currency volatility. The empirical evidence on
FDI flows to Eastern Europe and South Asia is mixed.
As in the trade regressions, the volatility of the
deutsche mark/dollar parity is the G-3 volatility
variable that seems to be more significant in this
analysis.12 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 16
Table 2
IMPACT OF G-3 CURRENCY VOLATILITY ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ EXPORTS
Measure of volatility: standard deviation of RER growth rates (V)
Deutsche Adjusted
Country mark / dollar Yen / dollar  R-squared
Africa
Cameroon 12.357 -2.325 0.57
(1.884)*** (-0.432)
Egypt -0.939 -1.165 0.95
(-0.544) (-0.768)
Gambia 0.527 -2.382 0.52
(0.151) (-0.765)
Ghana -8.437 9.472 0.42
(-1.393) (1.667)***
Kenya -1.589 -2.290 0.79
(-0.571) (-0.818)
Madagascar -0.718 0.146 -0.2
(-0.166) (0.038)
Morocco -2.413 -1.265 0.89
(-1.117) (-0.654)
Nepal -7.615 6.552 0.90
(-1.931)*** (1.801)***
Nigeria -0.038 -0.766 0.08
(-0.007) (-0.166)
Niger -2.602 6.697 0.68
(-0.911) (2.787)*
Rwanda 9.458 -7.038 0.49
(1.568) (-1.270)
Senegal -5.556 -2.766 0.63
(-2.416)** (-1.492)
South Africa -2.721 1.719 0.81
(-1.544) (1.116)
Togo 5.225 8.698 0.46
(1.767)*** (3.383)*
Asia
Philippines -1.995 1.681 0.95
(-0.915) (0.885)
India -4.950 3.885 0.95
(-2.015)** (1.714)***
Indonesia -3.686 0.552 0.71
(-0.868) (0.143)
Rep. of Korea -3.978 2.439 0.98
(-2.163)** (1.498)
Malaysia -4.367 -1.036 0.97
(-1.748)*** (-0.463)
Pakistan 3.690 -4.932 0.95
(1.384) (-1.945)***
Thailand -1.384 -0.494 0.98
(-0.602) (-0.239)
Deutsche Adjusted
Country mark / dollar Yen / dollar  R-squared
Western Hemisphere
Argentina -6.364 5.046 0.92
(-2.764)* (2.503)**
Bolivia -3.881 0.503 0.73
(-1.092) (0.157)
Brazil 0.887 -1.924 0.97
(0.459) (-1.177)
Chile 0.223 -0.857 0.99
(0.216) (-0.957)
Colombia 1.008 -0.110 0.94
(0.400) (-0.050)
Costa Rica -2.299 0.599 0.94
(-0.912) (0.276)
Dominican Rep. -1.671 0.161 0.90
(-0.555) (0.063)
Ecuador -0.270 -2.830 0.91
(-0.115) (-1.378)
El Salvador -10.101 4.581 0.09
(-1.794)*** (0.938)
Guatemala -5.706 3.104 0.33
(-1.599) (0.980)
Haiti 7.842 -0.400 0.64
(2.023)** (-0.116)
Honduras 0.995 2.006 0.81
(0.719) (1.657)***
Jamaica 1.543 -1.640 0.89
(0.847) (-1.060)
Mexico -2.606 2.996 0.94
(-0.759) (0.989)
Paraguay -2.659 0.104 0.93
(-0.692) (0.031)
Peru -4.584 4.097 0.57
(-1.610) (1.626)
Uruguay -2.502 -1.010 0.97
(-1.759)*** (-0.792)
Venezuela -4.004 -1.625 0.41
(-0.932) (-0.400)
Europe
Turkey -2.286 1.475 0.97
(-1.121) (0.825)
Note: *, ** and *** indicate the coefficient is statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively. Coefficients in bold
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Table 3
IMPACT OF G-3 CURRENCY VOLATILITY ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ EXPORTS
Measure of volatility: coefficient of variation (CV)
Deutsche Adjusted
Country mark / dollar Yen / dollar  R-squared
Africa
Cameroon 12.58 1.713 0.76
(4.691)* (0.820)
Egypt -1.739 -0.498 0.95
(-1.848)*** (-0.672)
Gambia 1.549 -1.585 0.54
(0.706) (-1.012)
Ghana -10.142 1.450 0.58
(-3.295)* (0.565)
Kenya -3.747 -0.643 0.83
(-2.467)** (-0.536)
Madagascar -4.697 0.639 0.03
(-2.108)** (0.347)
Morocco -1.374 -0.429 0.89
(-0.775) (-0.419)
Nepal -4.927 1.163 0.90
(-2.061)** (0.629)
Nigeria -5.808 2.004 0.32
(-2.341)** (0.979)
Niger -4.277 2.586 0.76
(-3.128)* (2.321)**
Rwanda 7.968 -0.596 0.55
(2.399)** (-0.218)
Senegal -3.266 -2.381 0.64
(-2.688)* (-2.491)**
South Africa -2.599 0.477 0.84
(-2.424)** (0.610)
Togo 2.616 3.979 0.17
(1.109) (2.281)**
Asia
Philippines 0.159 -1.165 0.95
(0.115) (-1.166)
India -3.867 0.109 0.95
(-2.705)** (0.098)
Indonesia -6.891 -0.663 0.82
(-3.575)* (-0.435)
Rep. of Korea -3.530 -0.082 0.99
(-3.359)* (-0.108)
Malaysia -3.460 -1.603 0.97
(-2.520)** (-1.512)
Pakistan 1.099 -2.992 0.95
(0.698) (-2.316)**
Thailand -2.257 -1.047 0.98
(-1.689)*** (-1.038)
Deutsche Adjusted
Country mark / dollar Yen / dollar  R-squared
Western Hemisphere
Argentina -2.927 2.189 0.91
(-2.005)** (1.982)**
Bolivia -5.763 -2.752 0.82
(-3.057)* (-1.850)***
Brazil 2.606 -1.074 0.97
(2.066)** (-1.448)
Chile -0.627 -0.010 0.99
(-0.932) (-0.022)
Colombia -2.051 0.032 0.95
(-1.538) (0.031)
Costa Rica -3.154 -0.865 0.95
(-2.121)** (-0.836)
Dominican Rep. 2.190 -1.375 0.91
(1.307) (-1.114)
Ecuador -1.561 -1.313 0.91
(-1.207) (-1.205)
El Salvador -7.195 1.236 0.16
(-2.151)** (0.496)
Guatemala -6.216 -0.141 0.55
(-3.675)* (-0.100)
Haiti 1.276 0.549 0.56
(0.520) (0.284)
Honduras -0.213 1.488 0.83
(-0.262) (2.437)**
Jamaica -1.133 -0.516 0.89
(-0.993) (-0.712)
Mexico 1.497 0.548 0.94
(0.739) (0.340)
Paraguay -5.314 -0.127 0.95
(-2.815)** (-0.085)
Peru -4.215 0.711 0.62
(-2.207)** (0.466)
Uruguay -0.729 -0.227 0.96
(-0.676) (-0.318)
Venezuela -5.855 -1.277 0.55
(-2.822)* (-0.757)
Europe
Turkey -1.065 -0.762 0.97
(-0.725) (-0.809)
Note: *, ** and *** indicate the coefficient is statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively. Coefficients in bold
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Table 4a
IMPACT OF G-3 CURRENCY VOLATILITY ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
(Measure of volatility: standard deviation of log changes)
Controlling for the Without controlling for the
United States interest rate United States interest rate
Deustche Yen / Adjusted Deustche Yen / Adjusted
Region mark / dollar dollar R-squared mark / dollar dollar R-squared
Sub-Saharan Africa -17.2 1.591 0.12 -17.2 1.792 0.16
(-0.85) (0.085) (-0.87) (0.105)
South Asia 2.397 1.824 0.73 2.243 -0.13 0.72
(0.481) (0.395) (0.446) (-0.03)
Eastern Europe and Central Asia -28.2 29.28 0.56 -28.6 23.52 0.56
(-1.44) (1.620) (-1.47) (1.397)
Latin America and the Caribbean -12.8 9.749 0.85 -13.1 5.335 0.85
(-0.98) (0.811) (-1.01) (0.473)
Middle East and North Africa 25.10 -12.3 0.07 24.95 -14.1 0.10
(2.164)** (-1.15) (2.196)** (-1.43)
East Asia and the Pacific -10.3 0.879 0.59 -11.3 -12.0 0.49
(-0.65) (0.059) (-0.63) (-0.77)
Note: *, ** and *** indicate the coefficient is statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively.  The numbers in
parentheses are  t-statistics.
Table 4
IMPACT OF G-3 CURRENCY VOLATILITY ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT
(Measure of volatility: standard deviation of log changes)
Controlling for the Without controlling for the
United States interest rate United States interest rate
Deustche Yen / Adjusted Deustche Yen / Adjusted
Region mark / dollar dollar R-squared mark / dollar dollar R-squared
Sub-Saharan Africa -6.25 17.54 0.29 -6.57 13.55 0.32
(-0.17) (0.529) (-0.18) (0.447)
South Asia -14.2 6.221 0.60 -14.0 8.238 0.62
(-1.09) (0.519) (-1.10) (0.750)
Eastern Europe and Central Asia -107.0 109.2 0.60 -109. 78.69 0.59
(-1.29) (1.427) (-1.32) (1.091)
Latin America and the Caribbean -55.5 44.09 0.84 -57.6 17.07 0.83
(-1.12) (0.965) (-1.12) (0.382)
Middle East and North Africa 150.2 -82.2 0.27 149.2 -95.1 0.29
(2.99)* (-1.76)*** (3.000)* (-2.20)**
East Asia and the Pacific -60.7 42.87 0.79 -62.8 16.05 0.75
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Table 5
IMPACT OF G-3 CURRENCY VOLATILITY ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT
(Measure of volatility: coefficient of variation of real exchange rate)
Controlling for the Without controlling for the
United States interest rate United States interest rate
Deustche Yen / Adjusted Deustche Yen / Adjusted
Region mark / dollar dollar R-squared mark / dollar dollar R-squared
Sub-Saharan Africa -32.5 24.88 0.47 -34.04 23.21 0.50
(-1.76)*** (1.670)*** (-1.941)*** (1.685)***
South Asia -14.3 -0.43 0.65 -12.76 1.397 0.65
(-1.98)** (-0.07) (-1.812)*** (0.252)
Eastern Europe and Central Asia -80.1 -80.1 0.60 -86.37 5.509 0.61
(-1.62) (0.312) (-1.831)*** (0.148)
Latin America and the Caribbean -37.9 -16.5 0.84 -44.84 -24.2 0.84
(-1.29) (-0.69) (-1.570) (-1.08)
Middle East and North Africa 30.12 -16.4 -0.04 22.678 -24.8 -0.03
(0.837) (-0.56) (0.6524) (-0.90)
East Asia and the Pacific -35.6 -3.73 0.78 -43.85 -12.9 0.77
(-1.44) (-0.18) (-1.778)*** (-0.66)
Table 5a
IMPACT OF G-3 CURRENCY VOLATILITY ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT + A9
(Measure of volatility: coefficient of variation of real exchange rate)
Controlling for the Without controlling for the
United States interest rate United States interest rate
Deustche Yen / Adjusted Deustche Yen / Adjusted
Region mark / dollar dollar R-squared mark / dollar dollar R-squared
Sub-Saharan Africa -27.54 4.565 0.36 -26.87 5.323 0.39
(-2.672)* (0.548) (-2.745)* (-2.74)*
South Asia -2.061 0.225 0.73 -2.674 -0.46 0.73
(-0.691) (0.093) (-0.928) (-0.20)
Eastern Europe and Central Asia -18.93 3.955 0.54 -19.70 3.086 0.57
(-1.596) (0.412) (-1.750)*** (0.348)
Latin America and the Caribbean -10.21 -6.45 0.86 -10.77 -7.07 0.86
(-1.358) (-1.06) (-1.507) (-1.25)
Middle East and North Africa 4.3596 -2.44 -0.14 3.3566 -3.56 -0.10
(0.5669) (-0.39) (0.4569) (-0.61)
East Asia and the Pacific -14.72 -10.2 0.66 -18.88 -14.8 0.61
(-1.694)*** (-1.45) (-2.076)** (-2.08)**
Note: *, ** and *** indicate the coefficient is statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively. The numbers in
parentheses are t-statistics. Coefficients in bold are negatively significant.16 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 16
VI. Impact of G-3 currency volatility
on currency crises
Several analysts have suggested that higher G-3
currency volatility is partially responsible for the
occurrence of exchange rate crises in developing
countries that had chosen to peg to a G-3 currency
(McKinnon, 1999; Allaire et al, 1999). In this situa-
tion, if that G-3 currency appreciates substantially
with respect to the rest of the world, so does the cur-
rency of the developing country. This, in turn, may
lead to external balance problems in the developing
country, that could eventually end in a currency cri-
sis. Although the argument does make sense, there
is no systematic evidence supporting such presump-
tion. Most of the arguments that have been used in
this regard are anecdotic, and are usually confined
to very specific situations (for example, Thailand in
1997). This issue is addressed empirically in this
section, using an extended version of an empirical
model on the determinants of currency crises
(Esquivel and Larraín, 2000 and 2001).
A. Definition of crisis13
In this paper we consider a currency crisis to
exist only when there is an important change in the
nominal exchange rate. Thus, unlike some of the pre-
vious studies on the topic, unsuccessful speculative
attacks are excluded from the definition.
For a nominal devaluation to qualify as a currency
crisis, two criteria are used. First, the devaluation
rate has to be large relative to what is considered
standard in a country. Second, the nominal devalua-
tion has to be meaningful, in the sense that it should
affect the purchasing power of the domestic currency.
Thus, nominal depreciations that simply keep up with
inflation differentials are not considered currency
crises even if they are fairly large.
Combining these two criteria it can be said that
a currency crisis exists only when a nominal devalu-
ation is accompanied by an important change in the
real exchange rate (at least in the short run). If it is
assumed that the price level reacts slowly to changes
in the nominal exchange rate, then, in practical terms,
a currency crisis can be detected simply by looking
at the changes in the real exchange rate. However, it
is also necessary to define how large the real ex-
change rate movement must be in order to be
considered as a crisis. Here, it is considered that a
currency crisis has occurred when at least one of the
following conditions is met:
Condition A: The accumulated three-month real ex-
change rate change is 15 per cent or
more or,
Condition B: The one-month change in the real ex-
change rate lies in the upper 0.5 per cent
of the distribution for each country
(provided that it exceeds 4 per cent).14
Condition A guarantees that any large real de-
preciation is counted as a currency crisis.15 Condition
B, on the other hand, attempts to capture changes in
the real exchange rate that are sufficiently large rela-
tive to the historical country-specific monthly change
of the real exchange rate.
B. Estimation methodology
The approach to estimate the determinants of
currency crises is as follows: the variable to be ex-
plained (yit) is dichotomous, and takes the value of 1
if a currency crisis occurred during year t; otherwise
it is zero. A probit model is estimated of the form:
Prob (Crisisit) = Prob (yit = 1) = F (b’xit-1)
where xit-1 is a vector of explanatory variables for
country i in period t-1, b is a vector of coefficients to
be estimated, and F is the normal cumulative distri-
bution function.
Note that in the estimation there is an implicit
assumption that an unobservable or latent variable
(yit*) exists which is described by
yit* = b’xit-1 + uit
where xit-1 and b are as before, uit is a normally dis-
tributed error term with zero mean and unit variance,
and the observed variable yit behaves according to
yit = 1 if yit* > 0, and yit = 0 otherwise.16
C. Empirical results
Table 6 shows the main results of this exercise.
The coefficients are adjusted to indicate changes in
the probability of the occurrence of a currency cri-
sis. Column (1) shows the basic result when the17 The Impact of G-3 Exchange Rate Volatility on Developing Countries
model is estimated on a sample of 34 high and mid-
dle-income countries. All the coefficients are
statistically significant and they have the expected
signs. That is, higher rates of seigniorage, larger real
exchange rate misalignment, higher deficits in the
current account, lower level of foreign exchange re-
serves, negative terms of trade shocks, negative per
capita income growth and a contagion effect (i.e.
being in a region where a neighbour has recently had
a currency crises), lead to a higher probability of
experiencing a currency crises.
Column (2) shows the results of applying the
same specification as in column (1) to developing
countries only. By doing this, the sample size is re-
duced by almost half. In the new regression, five out
Table 6
IMPACT OF G-3 CURRENCY VOLATILITY ON CURRENCY CRISES
Effects on probability, dF/dx
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Full sample Developing countries
Seignioragea 0.0194* 0.0220* 0.0234*
(4.00) (3.32) (3.58)
Real exchange rate misalignment 0.0031* 0.0043* 0.0046*
(2.90) (3.04) (3.18)
Current account balancea -0.0078** 0.0009 0.0002
(-2.50) (0.19) (0.05)
Log  (M2/reserves) 0.0563* 0.0855* 0.0829*
(3.34) (3.37) (3.25)
Terms of trade shock -0.0041** -0.0054** -0.0048***
(-2.07) (-2.18) (-1.92)
Negative growth dummyb 0.0511*** 0.0194 0.0158
(1.69) (0.46) (0.38)
Contagion effectc 0.1110* 0.0938** 0.0894**
(4.03) (2.33) (2.23)
G-3 currency volatilityd 0.0249***
(1.78)
Number of observations 713 398 398
Log likelihood -276.6 -164.1 -162.6
McFadden’s R2 0.131 0.142 0.149
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively. All regressions include a constant
term.  Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics.
a As a percentage of GDP.
b 1 if per capita income growth < 0.
c 1 if at least one country in the region had a crisis.
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of the seven explanatory variables remain highly sig-
nificant and all of them have coefficients with the
expected sign.
Column (3) adds the coefficient of variation of
the G-3 exchange rates to the estimation. The new
variable enters as a simple average of the CV of the
real exchange rates between the dollar, on the one
hand, and the yen, and the deutsche mark, on the
other. Its estimated coefficient is positive and statis-
tically significant at the 10 per cent level.17 The
parameter estimate implies that for every percent-
age point of increase in the volatility of the G-3
currencies, the probability of a currency crisis rises
by around 2.5 percentage points in a given year.
This result means that in periods of increased
exchange-rate volatility (i.e. when the measure of
volatility has risen by more than 4 percentage points
in a single year), the probability of a currency crises
in any developing country rises by about 10 percent-
age points. This effect should not be overlooked. Its
order of magnitude is almost equivalent to the in-
crease in the probability of a crisis associated to the
contagion effect – being in a region where another
country has recently experienced a currency crisis.
Of course, it is highly unlikely that G-3 exchange
rate volatility by itself will put an otherwise safe
country in a risky situation. However, it is clear that
an increase in G-3 exchange rate volatility may pre-
cipitate a currency crisis in a country that is already
vulnerable.
One final comment is in order. It can be argued
that G-3 exchange rate volatility influences currency
crises not through an overall index of volatility, but
through the real exchange-rate misalignment of spe-
cific countries. While this argument may be correct,
such a result cannot necessarily be attributed to the
G-3 exchange-rate system. Instead, this situation may
be the result of pegging to the wrong currency or,
more generally, it may be the result of following an
inappropriate exchange rate policy.18 On the other
hand, the empirical results presented above, which
show that changes in the effective real exchange rates
of developing countries are mostly driven by changes
in the bilateral real exchange rates of the dollar, also
suggest that G-3 exchange rate volatility affects de-
veloping countries through channels other than its
overall competitiveness. In this sense, it seems im-
portant to separate the effects of real exchange rate
misalignment from those associated to the G-3 ex-
change rate volatility, as it is done in the estimations
reported in table 6.
VII. Conclusions
The empirical evidence analysed in this paper
suggests that G-3 exchange rate volatility has cer-
tainly played a role in reducing exports from devel-
oping countries. The estimates suggest that an in-
crease of one percentage point on G-3 exchange rate
volatility depresses real exports from developing
countries by about 2 per cent. At the same time, G-3
exchange rate volatility also seems to have a nega-
tive effect on foreign direct investment inflows to
certain regions, although this evidence is less con-
clusive.
The results also show that G-3 exchange rate
volatility increases the probability of occurrence of an
exchange rate crisis in developing countries. This
effect is positive and significant, but the magnitude
of the associated coefficient suggests that even a large
increase in G-3 exchange rate volatility would not
be sufficient by itself to push a developing country
into a currency crisis. Nonetheless, it may play a role
in precipitating a crisis in an otherwise vulnerable
country.
All in all, these findings suggest that greater
stability in the international exchange rate system
may be desirable in order to promote higher volumes
of trade and foreign direct investment inflows in de-
veloping countries. The results also suggest that an
added benefit of lower G-3 currency volatility would
be to reduce the occurrence of exchange rate crises
in the developing world.
Notes
1 Section 2 in Clarida (1999) presents a summary of the
arguments that have been put forth against the post Bretton-
Woods exchange rate arrangement (or, the non-system, as
their critics like to call it).
2 In the empirical applications of this paper, the G-3 coun-
tries are Germany, Japan and the United States. Accord-
ingly, the G-3 currencies are the dollar, the yen and the
deutsche mark. Since January 1999, the G-3 encompasses
the United States, Japan and the twelve countries the euro
region.
3 See, for example, McKinnon (1999).
4 Williamson (1986) and Currie and Wren-Lewis (1990)
present an early discussion on the possibility of establish-
ing a target zone among the G-3 currencies with the ob-
jective of reducing exchange rate fluctuations. Clarida
(1999) surveys five alternative proposals to reduce fluc-
tuations among G-3 currencies.
5 Goldberg and Klein (1998) have shown that changes in
G-3 real exchange-rates may have an effect on the inflows
of foreign direct investment in some regions.19 The Impact of G-3 Exchange Rate Volatility on Developing Countries
6 This point has been emphasized by Frankel and Roubini (2000).
7 This measure has been used, among others, by Arize et al.
(2000), Kenen and Rodrik (1986), and Chowdhury (1993).
See McKenzie (1999) for a review of the alternative meas-
ures of volatility that have been used in the literature on
exchange-rate volatility and trade flows.
8 It is interesting to note that some authors use this indica-
tor as if it were a measure of the standard deviation of the
real exchange rate (and not of its growth rate).
9 Empirical results will be presented, however, using both
measures of volatility.
10 Interest rate variability is the CV of the nominal interest
rate. Exchange rate variability is defined as the simple
average of the CV of each country with respect to the other
two G-3 currencies.
11 See McKenzie (1999) for a recent survey. Recent studies
along this vein include Dell’Ariccia (1999) and Arize et
al. (2000).
12 Notice that only two volatility variables are included in
this analysis. This is because it cannot be assumed that
the volatility in the three parities is due to the G-3 ex-
change rate system. Instead, it can be assumed that a de-
veloping country’s exchange rate may closely follow any
of the G-3 currencies, so that only the volatility in the
other two G-3 parities is exogenous to that country.
13 This section draws on Esquivel and Larraín (2000). The
reader is referred to that work for further details on the
methodology.
14 If the distribution of the monthly changes is normal, this
condition implies that the one-month change is higher than
2.54 times the country specific standard deviation of the
monthly rate of change of the real exchange rate.
15 The threshold value of 15 per cent is somewhat arbitrary,
but sensitivity analysis shows that the precise threshold is
largely irrelevant for the results.
16 In this regard there is a slight difference to Esquivel and
Larrain (2000), where a probit model with random effects
was used, but where it was also shown that there are no
substantial differences in the results obtained with alter-
native estimation methods. To simplify the exposition of
the results, a more standard econometric methodology has
been used here.
17 None of these results changes qualitatively if instead of
using a simple average of the CVs, only one of them is used
as representative of the exchange-rate system instability.
18 This may be the case of Thailand in 1997 and of Argen-
tina in 2001. These countries had chosen to peg to the
dollar, despite the fact that the bulk of their international
transactions is with countries other than the United States.
The appreciation of the dollar in 1995–1998 and in 2000–
2001 clearly affected the international competitiveness of
these countries. However, it is hard to say that the United
States is to blame for such situations. Instead considera-
tion should be given to whether pegging to the dollar was
the best thing to do for these two countries in the first place.
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